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MEDICAL WITNESSES IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
IVAN C. RUTLEDGEt
The essential characteristic of workmen's compensation schemes has
been their elimination or de-emphasis of the notion of fault on the part
of the employer One of the intended effects of the elimination of
questions of fault was to accelerate the disposition of contested cases, as
well as to make it easier for the workman to obtain benefits in at least
some amount. Questions of fault having been either eliminated or largely
reduced, the focus has shifted to medical questions the nature of the
injury or disease, its relationship to the employment, and its disabling
effects. In the current outlook of our secular society, there is little or
no authoritative morality except as it is pronounced in: law by politically
selected officers, so questions of fault are peculiarly adapted to resolu-
tion by adversary litigaion. In medicine the contrary-is generally true,
the authority of Science tends to sustain the pronouncements of -one who
can claim its authority on the-strength of his profession. Processes of
litigation as we know them today were developed in'the context of ques-
tions of fault, but such questions have receded in workmen's compensa-
tion and, although litigation .was transferred to newly invented tribunals,
it was preserved. So it-is that litigation has been preserved for the reso-
lution of medical questions, for which it is ill-adapted. It is not necessary
to demonstrate that'-litigation looks most clumlsy when it undertakes to
deal with questions of expert opinion.2 It may be pbssible, however, to
t Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law. This paper was presented
to the First Wisconsin Conference on- Work and the Heart, Wisconsin Heart Associa-
tion and Marquette University School of Medicine.
1. An alternative emphasis has been placed upon their function as part of a system
of income protection by insurance, a philosophy especially germane to calculating the
monetary level of benefits and calculating disability by occupational rather than physical
or mental impairment. See Larson, Changing Concepts it Workmen's Compensation,
14 NACCA L.J. 23 (1954) , Riesenfeld, Contemporary Trends in Compensation for
Industrial Accidents Here and Abroad, 42 CALIF. L. REv. 531 (1954).
2. For example, in Flowers v. State, - Ind.---, 139 N.E.2d 185, 196 (1956), the
court approved' this instruction. " the law of Indiana recognizes temporary in-
sanity. You are not to be influenced by the statement of any medical physician who
testifies, if they testify that there is no such thing as temporary insanity. There is a
distinction between the definition of temporary insanity in the law and in medicine
and it is the law in Indiana that if a person is temporarily insane at the time of the
commission of the alleged act then you must find him not guilty." Of course no court
would so reprobate medical testimony that there is no such thing as being bewitched,
even if the code denounced witchcraft as a crime. Cf. Reg. v. Machekequonabe, 28 Ont.
Rep. 309 (1898), taking judicial notice that there is no such thing as a Wel;digq, or
evil spirit, clothed in human form. which eats human beings. See also Thayer, Trial by
Jury of Things Supernatural, LEGAL EssAyS 325 (1908).
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examine the administration of workmen's compensation to determine
what, if any, opportunities it may afford for somehow avoiding the
notorious battle of the experts.
Three parts of the problem may for convenience be taken as ways
of seeing into it. First, the determination of the nature of an injury or
disease with particular reference to its connection with an employment,
and to some extent with reference to the extent of its disabling effects,
depends in large part for its reliability upon the accumulation and preser-
vation of information upon which medical inferences leading to the de-
termination must be based. Second, the reliability of the determination
may, in some of the most difficult cases, equally depend upon the quality
of expert opinion brought to bear on the data that have been accumulated
and preserved. Finally, even with the most thoroughgoing processes of
investigation and recording, and the employment of the best current
medical opinion, the final results may be unsatisfactory unless the method
of organizing the processes by which expert opinion is brought to bear
upon the data is such as to provide safeguards against its misapplication.
These aspects, then, (1) the accumulation and preservation of informa-
tion, (2) the mobilization of expert opinion, and (3) the organization
of the methods by which it is brought to bear upon the information, are
the three windows chosen here for a view of medical testimony in the ad-
ministration of a plan of workmen's compensation.
Although questions of fault are less prominent and questions of
medicine more so under workmen's compensation plans, it would be a
mistake to suppose that the conclusion should be in favor of placing their
administration in the hands of medical referees or panels. Perhaps the
most significant argument for lay administration can be suggested by
relating an episode in Jenkins v. Industrial Commission.' A workman
was handling an automobile battery when it exploded, causing him to
jerk his head back suddenly and slap at his eyes with such force that the
frames of his spectacles were bent. Three weeks later an operation to
correct a separation of the retina in his right eye failed, and he subse-
quently received compensation for loss of vision in the right eye. Four
months later a physician observed loss of vision in the left eye, which he
estimated as 75%. In proceedings for compensation for injury to the
left eye, the commission appointed three eye specialists to examine the
record in the case and give an opinion on the relationship of the accident
to detachment of the retina in the left eye. In their report they said:
3. 77 Ariz. 377, 272 P.2d 601 (1954).
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"The files state that Mr. Jenkins (1) was a high myope,
(2) had bilateral cataract extractions, (3) had bilateral capsu-
lotomies, and (4) had peripheral retinal degeneration of the
left eye between 5 and 7 o'clock with many vitreous floaters,
as indicated in Dr. Irvine's report . . . 4 months after the in-
jury, and at which time no evidence of detachment was found.
We, the undersigned, feel that (1) the above findings are
more contributing causes of a detachment than was the indirect
injury, and (2) since no evidence of detachment was found 4
months after the injury that the resultant detachment 2 months
later, or 6 months after the injury, was due to pathological dis-
organization of the retina rather than to trauma. We feel that
the Commission was very generous and liberal in accepting the
detachment of the right eye as compensable as all these types of
cases present an element of doubt. We are of the opinion that
the detachment of the left eye is not related to his injury what-
soever."' (Emphasis added)
On the other hand, the other doctors, who testified by deposition,
found a probable connection between detachment of the left eye and the
injury. No point is made here whether obtaining an opinion by written
report is less reliable than obtaining an opinion by testimony subject to
cross-examination. It is also unnecessary to characterize the language
italicized above as representative of medical opinion in any degree. The
question is how this language aided the triers of fact to reach a decision.
On the one hand it suggests that the commission had erred in the other
case and that both cases were subject to the same or a similar degree of
doubt. Thus the expression can be taken as a way of advising the com-
mission about the degree of doubt that obtains on such an issue as a
general scientific fact. On the other hand it suggests that the commis-
sion should make compromise awards in doubtful cases. That is, when
there is doubt whether several injuries should be attributed to an indus-
trial accident, compensation should be awarded for less than all of those
injuries instead of resolving the doubt as to each of them. This in-
terpretation of the italicized language amounts to an interpretation of
the statute, which is not within the special competence of a medical ex-
pert. It therefore casts doubt upon the reliability of the medical opinion
given, that the separation of the left eye was not connected with the ac-
4. 77 Ariz. 377, 381, 272 P.2d 601, 603 (1954).
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cident, because this may be a legal, or medico-legal, rather than medical
conclusion.5
The use of medical experts as triers of fact is of course subject to
numerous objections in addition to the risk that the medical opinion may
be consciously or unconsciously affected or displaced by a legal opinion,
without adequate procedural machinery to determine the accuracy of the
legal opinion.' The day-to-day work of administrators of compensation,
although it does not deal extensively with questions of fault, is devoted
to administrative processes that much of the time require no medical
expertise. Among these processes are those that serve the first func-
tion mentioned above, the accumulation and preservation of informa-
tion. In the Jenkins case7 the history prior to the explosion was near-
sightedness as long as the patient could remember, and an extra capsular
cataract extraction performed on the right eye five years before the
explosion, with post-operative experience of irritation, redness, and pain
for some time. The certainty of opinion could have perhaps been im-
proved, especially with reference to the right eye, had it so chanced that
medical examination had intervened between the operation and the ex-
plosion, and the nearer to the explosion the greater the probability of
consistent medical opinion expressing a high degree of confidence in the
existence or non-existence of connection with the explosion.8
5. The court, from a comparison of the opinions, directed the commission to set
aside its order denying compensation, one justice dissenting. 77 Ariz. 377, 272 P.2d 601
(1954).
6. What professional qualifications could be hired for the salaries paid compensa-
tion commissioners? Would the possessor of medical qualifications be content to spend
his days deciding issues that require no specialized knowledge and giving a fair hearing
to the parties to those issues?
7. 77 Ariz. 377, 272 P.2d 601 (1954).
8. The function of expert opinion on the relationship between two events is to
establish its existence or non-existence within a described range of certainty. The
trier of the fact is then to determine what has been established with what degree of
certainty and resolve any doubts accordingly by a finding of fact, or perhaps by a
denial of a finding of fact. Legislatures and courts seek to maintain legal control over
this process by the creation and application of presumptions and burdens of proof which
prescribe degrees of certainty, such as "preponderance of evidence," "substantial evi-
-dence," "scintilla of evidence," "speculation and surmise," "clear and convincing
evidence," "evidence beyond a reasonable doubt."
These verbal legal controls constitute an effort to objectify what is inevitably a sub-
jective process, the process of resolving doubts that arise in the face of incomplete
knowledge. This "resolution" of doubts after all available information is in, if deliberate
rather than impulsive, can be thought of as a process of reasoning them away, or putting
them out of attention for purposes of decision, or of concentrating upon them to the ex-
clusion of inferences that might be drawn in their absence. The purpose for which the de-
cision is to be made, e.g., payment or denial of payment, radical or conservative treatment
or no treatment at all, further exploration to obtain further knowledge, etc., will influ-
ence the trier of fact, and as explained in connection with the Jenkins case, may influence
the witness, regardless of verbal legal controls. Litigation is no less than a procedure
for raising and evaluating doubts, and when witnesses anticipate the trier of fact by an
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L Accumulation and Preservation of Information
Economic considerations limit the activity of collecting information
that may improve prospects of certainty in determining causes of dis-
ability. It would be wasteful to conduct medical surveillance of all em-
ployees on a level that assumed that all of them would become parties to
contested cases concerning their disabilities. A scheme of workmen's
compensation does, however, apply to a situation that is clearly enough
defined to make it administratively feasible to maintain a system of
accumulating information. The existence of an employment relation
itself yields certain records such as payroll records which may be suf-
ficient to show days, and even hours, on the job. Administration of
claims provides records for the future of facts gathered on previous in-
vestigations. Public offices outside the compensation system, such as
courts, public health, and vital statistics and coroners' offices, may have
information. Hospitals and medical and legal practitioners' offices are
additional repositories, although some of this information may be con-
fidential. Initiative of the employer in requiring medical examinations
upon beng hired and occasionally or periodically thereafter can give -in-
formation that may-become useful.' This regime, because of considera-
tions of economics and employee relations, should be selective in ap-
proach, so that intensity and frequency of examination are guided by the
apparent needs of the case. For example, there may be a correlation be-
tween absenteeism and compensation neurosis.
Many compensation systems include a requirement that the work-
man report the occurrence of an injury to his employer. Although by
the time of the injury badly needed information may be lacking, it may
have been impossible or impracticable to have exercised sufficiently selec-
tive foresight to have assured an adequate record of such information.
Yet certainly upon the occurrence of an injury a specific signal for selec-
tion is important. It may be impossible then to gauge how important it
is to select the injured employee for development of his medical history,
but without the signal another opportunity for obtaining greater reliabil-
opinion that evaluates what ought to be the disposition of the case as distinct from an
opinion that describes the degree of doubt on the issue, the procedure is perverted. The
"ultimate fact" rule, now properly under general attack, presents a related question.
See Ladd, Expert Testinomiy, 5 VAI . L. REv. 414, 423-25 (1952), for a discussion lead-
ing to the conclusion that a violation of this rule is an "imaginary error."
9. For a reference to the "current hiring practice" of conducting a thorough medi-
cal examination and investigation of the medical history for latent physical conditions,
see Comment, 44 CALiF. L. Rxv. 548 (1956). The Comment points out that the rule in
California gives impetus to this practice because it imposes risk of greater liability upon
employers in cases where the workman is apparently well but is really not than in cases
where he is obviously suffering some disability or where he is actually in good health
and sound coidition.
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ity of medical opinion will have been lost.
The main problem in administering this requirement is how much
notice of injury must the employee have had before he is obliged to report
it to his employer. In most jurisdictions the period within which the re-
port must be made does not begin to run until the injury manifests dis-
abling effects.1" This means a possible time lag within which the op-
portunity to obtain valuable information is lost, unless there is an ex-
amination by chance. Moreover, the statutory period itself constitutes a
similar risk of lost opportunities. The purposes of the requirement,
however, to enable the employer to provide treatment that will minimize
the seriousness of the injury, as well as to make possible an early investi-
gation, must be balanced against the hardship11 that would be imposed
upon the workman if a shorter period were given or if he were required
to have a degree of foreknowledge of disability that could not be ex-
pected of him. The latitude afforded the workman by the requirement
as it is usually made argues for a program of health and safety education
on the job that includes encouragement of voluntary reporting to an of-
fice or aid station, where the information will be intelligently handled
and followed up when professional investigation or treatment seems to
be indicated.
The accumulation and preservation of information upon which ex-
pert opinion can be based begins in an intensive fashion when treatment
begins, or at the latest, when a dispute about liability or extent or perma-
nence of disability has reached such a point in litigation as to make it
necessary. The most prominent issue for medical testimony is the con-
nection between the work and the injury, with its disabling effects. Pro-
fessor Small has emphasized that the consideration of employment as a
"risk factor" in disablement is uncongenial to the medical discipline,
which looks for "cause" in etiology.12 The factors that range beyond
pathology are outside the responsibility of the doctor as a scientist, al-
though it may be that diagnostics can never entirely dispense with a de-
10. Contra, under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act, at least when the
workman is aware of some injury. Pillsbury v. United Eng. Co., 342 U.S. 197 (1952).
Other cases to the contrary are found in North Carolina, Illinois, Kentucky, and Pennsyl-
vania, under statutes that prescribe the beginning of the period as the "accident." Okla-
homa and North Dakota also start the running of the period with the "injury" regardless
of apparent effects. See 2 LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw § 78.42(b)
(1952). The period ranges from 24 hours to 6 months when specified in terms of a
quantity of time. A few jurisdictions further specify a maximum term to which delay
may be excused, ranging from 30 days to a year. Some statutes say "immediately,"
"forthwith," or "as soon as practicable." Id. at App. C., pp. 554-55.
11. "Shocking injustice," according to Panchak v. Simmons Co., 15 N.J. 13, 103
A.2d 884, 891 (1954).
12. Small, Gaffing at a Thing Called Cause: Medico-Legal Conflicts in the Con-
cept of Causation, 31 TEXAS L. REV. 630 (1953).
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gree of autonomous, free-hand detective work. It is beyond the qualifi-
cations of the writer as well as the scope of this paper to explore the
approach of either the clinician or the expert to whom a subject is re-
ferred for examination pending litigation. Two aspects of the problem
of accumulating information at this stage must however be emphasized.
One is the desirability of a high degree of completeness of investigation
and the other is the necessity for systematic and durable recording of
the information obtained.
Ideally, when for the first time a potential medical witness examines
a workman in the context of possible industrial injury or disease, exist-
ing information relevant to establishing what it is and whether it is con-
nected with employment should be collected at one place. This "clearing-
house" function is essential for purposes of litigation, even when diagno-
sis is obvious from objective findings alone, although in such cases, as-
suming that such cases occur, the history elicited from the workman may
be summary and other types of information, such as that contained in
hospital records or records of other doctors, may be explored only to
the extent of identifying their sources. At the other extreme are cases
in which the most sweeping and random techniques of exploring the past
are called into play; the workman is searchingly cross-examined; the
recollections and records of members of the family, associates on the job
and elsewhere, other doctors and professional men, public offices, hos-
pitals, etc. are searched; information is compiled in minute detail with
rigid adherence to the form in which it was originally cast; the physical
examination is detailed and comprehensive, employing tests and tactics
that may be expensive and even impose risks on the workman; extensive
resort is had to the laboratory, and specialists and consultants are drawn
into the investigation. Medical investigators will appreciate the signifi-
cance of those two extremes because they superficially indicate the range
of measures that are appropriate as guides for treatment. The prospect
of litigation merely opens up more lines of relevance than when only the
question of treatment is in view. The universe of investigation in work-
men's compensation adds the question of employment as a risk factor
in whatever disabliity may be feared from the injury or disease that is
revealed.
Little needs to be added for present purposes concerning records of
these investigations. The principle is that the memory of the examiner is
unreliable, at least without means of "refreshing" it, and the labor that
went into the investigation should not be wasted for lack of a system for
finding the records, lack of a record of what could easily be recorded at
319
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the time, or lack of durability of the record."
The object of gathering such information as will obviate unneces-
sary resort to inference, expert opinion, and surmise justifies the sug-
gestion that medical practitioners will respond to a social obligation to
find out whether litigation; either of a tort or workmen's compensation
claim, is likely to be involved, and, if so, to investigate for litigation as
well as treatment. Of course it is the duty of the lawyer also to investi-
gate for litigation, but his investigation will be more fruitful, and liti-
gation may be avoided more frequently, if it can build upon prior medical
investigation that was timely and under expert direction. The responsi-
bility of the doctor to whom a workman is referred for examination in
view of litigation is clear; and especially when the referral is partisan
it is with equal clarity the duty of the lawyer to contribute what he can
to extending the scope of investigation in the directions indicated by the
needs of litigation.
The statutes generally require the workman to submit to examina-
tion, although they vary as between examination by a medical practi-
tioner selected by the board and one selected by the employer or insurer.
Many of them are deficient in that they lack provisions requiring post-
mortem examination and allowing for exhumation in proper cases.1"
The importance of autopsy information is great enough to justify explicit
statutory rules regulating the balance between the need for information
and the sensibilities of. the survivors.
II. Mobilization of Expert Opinion
"Our inexpert use of experts" 5 presents the paradox of the layman
evaluating the qualifications of the professional. The necessity for skilled
assistance in the trial of a factual issue was born of an awareness that
the common knowledge and experience of jurors would not be adequate
to deal with the issue. This awareness, and this claim of qualification,
under present practice, arise from partisan assertion of the deficiency of
common knowledge, and partisan proffer of qualifications that will fill
the gap.
The issue of the need for expert assistance may be illustrated by
Thoreau v. Industrial Accident Comm'n.Y The workman in the course
of his employment sustained a violent blow in the pit of his stomach
13. See PHYSICIAN IN THE CouRTRoom 78-80 (Schroeder ed. 1954) for a 13-point
checklist for records.
14. See Petition of Sheffield Farms Co., 22 N.J. 548, 126 A.2d 886 (1956).
15. Weihofen, An Alternative to the Battle of the Experts: Hospital Examination
of Criminal Defendants Before Trial, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 419 (1935).
16. 120 Cal. App. 67, 7 P.2d 767 (1932).
320
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from the end of a large timber. After that time he suffered intense
pain in the stomach area and was unable to keep food on his stomach or
to do any work. A complete clinical review revealed to the specialist to
whom he was referred a pyloric stenosis, or narrowing of the opening
from the stomach into* the small intestine. Now if a non-medical wit-
ness had undertaken to testify to the existence of the pyloric stenosis, it
would certainly have been required that he make some showing of his
ability to perceive or infer it. This showing would have had to take the
form of evidence of special experience, because it can be judicially no-
ticed that common experience does not enable witnesses to detect pyloric
stenosis. That is, the tribunal can judicially knQw the meaning of the
term in a general way, sufficient to raise serious doubts, at least, whether
a witness without special tutoring or experience would perceptually recog-
nize a pyloric stenosis. It would probably be beyond all doubt to the tri-
bunal that such a witness would be unable to find one by inferential
means such as judging signs and symptoms or conducting tests, The
existence of a broken finger might or might not be recognizable .from
common experience, and -in this case the tribunal might require expert
assistance to determine how doubtful the case was.
Thus, the paradox of lay determination of the qualifications of ex-
perts is compgunded by the paradox of lay determination of the need for
experts. Although both issues are addressed by partisan assertion and
denial, it can be seen that logically there is an infinite regression here:
the determination of the qualification of experts or the need for an ex-
pert calls for expert assistance, which in turn calls for an expert to de-
termine the expertness of the assistant, etc. Dean Wigmore characterizes
rules of expert qualification and their administration as finicking mat-
ters which should be left exclusively to the discretion of the trial judge
without appellate review." An it seems to be generally true that this
is the case, with the result that the qualification of an expert is rather a
perfunctory matter procedurally unless the advocate who produces him
prudently chooses to make careful adduction of his. qualifications. The
scene of combat shifts to efforts to disqualify particular answers and
weaken the weight of the expert testimony given. Furthermore, in most
cases, as in the case of the "unobviously" broken finger or the pyloric
stenosis, lay knowledge is so clearly imperfect as to make the need for
expert assistance apparent.
The pit-of-the-stomach case also involved an expert conclusion that
the cause was unrelated to-the blow and was attributable to a pre-existing
ulcerous condition. So far, if there-had been no blov and the pre-exist-
17. 2 WIGM ORE ON EvmENcE § 561 (3d ed. 1940).
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ing ulcerous condition had been patent, the lay mind probably would have
reacted favorably to the suggestion that a doctor should be called in to
verify the existence of a connection. However, it was taken as a fact
that the ulcers, although they pre-existed the blow, were asymptomatic.
How this fact was established is not clear from the report of the case,
and the reader is left to speculate whether timely investigation might
have revealed a pre-existing pyloric stenosis. The layman's post hoc,
ergo propter hoc thus is bolstered by the evidence of a blow falling on the
very part of the body that becomes symptomatic. Not much belief in
witches is required to convert sequence into consequence here."
There were two weaknesses of the expert opinion, one that the spe-
cialist made a written report and did not appear for cross-examination,
and the other that the specialist was retained by the employer. The
technique of the court was to find that the opinion was not based on a
consideration of the fact that the existing ulcerous condition was asymp-
tomatic and that disability began immediately after the blow. It may be
true that the opinion was narrowly confined to physical examination re-
gardless of history, but if it is true, it is easier to accept because the
specialist was not a witness, the scope of whose opinion could be freely
explored at the hearing so that it could not be misunderstood. Perhaps
also it is easier so to interpret the opinion because of a possible inference
that the witness was sufficiently partial to his employer to put on
blinders that would confine him narrowly to his specialty. Finally,
there was apparently no expert testimony to advise the court whether
medical knowledge could help the court to make or refuse to make the
connection between the blow and the disability, or whether so far as
medical expertise is concerned this was an imponderable, to be disposed
of as an ordinary issue of fact. Logically, there are four possibilities.
Given these facts medical knowledge is (1) competent to infer that the
dissability was the exclusive product of the blow, (2) competent to in-
fer that the disability was within certain limits of probability attributable
to the blow within certain degrees of intensity of connection such as "ag-
gravating," "lighting-up," "precipitating," etc., (3) competent to infer
a complete absence of relationship to the blow, or (4) incompetent to add
anything to common experience that would be significant. If the opinion
had been regarded as founded on all the believable evidence, it would of
course have carried with it advice from the expert by implication that the
court needed expert advice on the merits. The position of the court in
drawing an inference of connection carries with it an implied holding
18. The court did. Thoreau v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 120 Cal. App. 67, 7
P.2d 767 (1932).
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that expert advice was dispensable, a doubtful conclusion even if there
had been no expert opinion in the case. But the point is that it is un-
satisfactory to leave it initially to the party having the burden of proof
and ultimately to the tribunal to decide without expert assistance whether
expert opinion is indispensable.
Also, it is unsatisfactory to rely upon partisan experts both for ad-
vice that they are needed and for advice on the merits. A specialist who
does not believe his advice will be helpful and cannot be so persuaded is
not likely to be offered. If an expert is offered, then, one result of his
presence in the proceeding is likely to be an increase in the burden of
proof, and the injured workman or his beneficiary is more likely to need
an expert witness than if the employer or carrier had not offered one.
Moreover, with the multiplication of partisan experts, the probabilities
diminish that any expert will be found to advise against the usefulness
of expert advice on the merits, even in a case that may appear to be close
to common experience, or, at the other extreme, appears to be beyond
specialized knowledge, from the jangling contradictions of the supposed
experts. "Isn't there an old rule which suggests that a question never
be asked to which the answer is not known?"'" Answer: The answer to
this one is not known, unless someone discovers its existence; proof of
non-existence of a rule is hard to develop, when there are no spatial or
temporal limits to the search, and the conceptual limits are vague. How-
ever, it may be confidently asserted that enlightenment consisting of a
report that the answer is not known may be most helpful to a tribunal
faced with the problem of giving an answer one way or the other. Many
of the "technicalities" of litigation are concessions to the shortness of
life.2"
Three weaknesses of partisan selection of experts may be distin-
guished. One is the absence of special skill to evaluate claims of expert-
ness. Another is the suspicion of bias. Finally, there is the improbability
of disinterested advice as to the helpfulness of expert advice. Partisan
legal advice is not subject to these objections because the judiciary, with
its familiarity with law-ways, is able to estimate the need for help to
evaluate the qualifications of the advocate, and to discount the partisan
influence. Moreover, so far as the partisan influence is concerned, the
method is designed to recognize simultaneously divergent views, whereas
19. Hammon, Explosion Damage Cases: I~tsurance Procedure and Expert Wit-
nesses, 43 A.B.A.J. 135, 185 (1957).
20. "The conditions under which the tribunal is required to conduct its inquiries,
the limits of time and of the means of investigation, are such as no scientist would
tolerate." Morgan, Suggested Remedy for Obstructions to Expert Testimony by Rides
of Evidence, 10 U. Cl. L. Rzv. 285 (1943).
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in matters of fact the scientific acceptance of general propositions as only
provisional can hardly go so far as to contradict the basic assumption of
an existing consistent external Nature. Hence the incongruity of a
"battle of the experts" in which conflict of opinion evokes suspicion of
bias or false pretensions of knowledge or both, and men of integrity and
ability in their own fields are arrayed in false colors, many times to
their pain and disgust.
These difficulties can be overcome in part by specialization of work-
men's compensation tribunals. Even if they are not recognized as having
a degree of specialized knowledge that entitles them to a scope of official
notice that contracts the area of controversy," their specialized knowledge
can be brought into play in other ways. By a process of self-education
they can determine with greater precision than, say, a judge who less
frequently deals with medical questions, not what the "going medical
rules" are, but what help the sciences of medicine can give. By a process
of acquiring familiarity with the reputations of medical practitioners
and others who may be called as expert witnesses, they can obtain in-
sights for the evaluation of qualifications of expert witnesses. So long
as their decisions are binding on judicial review in terms of the substan-
tial evidence formula it will not greatly matter, except to save time in
the proceedings, whether the evaluation of qualifications is expressed
in a decision on qualification of the proferred expert or in a decision on
the weight of his evidence. The point is suggested by an observation of
the court in Giant Grip Co. v. Indwstrial Comm'n:22
"Counsel for appellants remind us that counsel for the
commission, contending for a different rule in the Merton case,
supra, argued that to insist on such a requirement [the appor-
tionment of disability among successive employers] was to
demand the impossible, for a credible medical witness would
not venture to apportion the cause of disability with sufficient
certainty among successive accidents. It is clear from the pres-
ent record that counsel underestimated the daring of doctors
and the credulity of commissions."
It has been justly observed that a doctor who has studied medicine
and observed patients primarily in terms of therapeutics may not be
qualified to say whether injury can produce a certain disease, but that
if he goes to court to accommodate an old patient he may be qualified
as a thoroughgoing expert and find it hard to confess the limits of his
21. McCarthy v. Ind. Comm'n, 194 Wis. 198, 215 N.W. 824 (1927).
22. 271 Wis. 583, 74 N.W.2d 182 (1956).
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knowledge.2' The provisional character of scientific findings and their
constant revision under conditions of modern research render it unlikely
that the best current knowledge will be widely diffused and more likely
that it will be obtainable from highly specialized students of a narrow
field. The problem is how the officers charged with administration of
workmen's compensation may best draw upon these resources. In the
solution of this problem the contribution of the general practitioner, who
is more likely to have collected and recorded or remembered the infor-
mation that depends upon direct perceptual knowledge informed by the
medical disciplines," must not be ignored or discounted. The narrow
specialist called in at a later time cannot be expected to supply reliable
information when gaps in information that should have been obtained
earlier stretch out the chain of inferences he is asked to make.
III. Organization
The realm of currently advancing knowledge can be made available
by organizing the methods by which expert opinion is brought to bear
upon information. The traditional method in court is by the use of the
hypothetical question.25  Among its advantages are the employment of
experts who have no way of knowing the truth of the facts assumed in
the hypothesis, with the consequent specialization of functions as between
them and other witnesses, and the opportunity of obtaining opinions from
a given expert upon alternative assumed conditions. Among its dis-
advantages are the complex shape some hypothetical quesctions take and
their extreme prolixity, or on the other hand, the vagueness with which
others are framed, with the result in both cases that it is difficult for
the auditor to have in mind the exact state of facts to which the opinion
is addressed, if indeed it is not difficult to appreciate that the expert thor-
oughly understands the question. For the courts, the Model Code of
Evidence and the Model Expert Testimony Act have shown the trend
of thinking in favor of greater flexibility in specification of the hypothe-
sis, to avoid the confusion attendant upon prolix questions,2" and the
desirability of court-appointed experts." The policy with respect to
appointment of witnesses by the court seems to be to avoid the difficul-
23. Smith, Scientific Proof and Relations of Law and Medicine, 10 U. CHI. L. REv.
242, 247 (1943).
24. Contrast the approach, framed presumably in terms of a lay witness oblivious
to the possibilities of litigation or other need to recall, described as Stimulation of W
by the Event, in Cleary, Evidence as a Problem in Communicating, 5 VAND. L. REv.
277, 283-87 (1952).
25. Busch, The Hypothetical Question, 3 J. PUB. L. 550 (1954).
26. McCormick, Some Observations Upon the Opinion Ride and Expert Testimony,
23 TEXAs L. REv. 109 (1945).
27. Ibid.; Ladd, Expert Testinwny, 5 VAND. L. R i'. 414 (1952).
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ties inherent in a rigorous exclusion of testimony of expert witnesses
whose qualifications are doubtful or of whom bias is suspected, merely
by obtaining more reliable testimony. This policy puts the tribunal in a
position to discount to zero, if it seems advisable, the weight of the
former.
The picture of the small group of lawyers who have harnessed up
the small group of expert witnesses, whose role as they conceive it is to
win a case,"8 is reflected in the experiment in the courts of New York
and Bronx Counties, New York.2 9 Some of the features of this plan
are adaptable to, and have been in essence employed in the field of work-
men's compensation. The New York Academy of Medicine, and the
New York County and Bronx Medical Societies cooperated to assemble
a list of highly qualified doctors in the special fields the justices indi-
cated were needed. Not only were they highly qualified but none of
them had been prominently identified with either plaintiffs or defend-
ants in personal injury cases. A court rule set up the procedure, which
calls for consultation of the justice with counsel for the parties, after
which he may order the case referred to an impartial expert. The expert
examines and reports through a Medical Report Office, the clerk of
which makes copies of the report available to the parties. The impartial
expert is furnished with the medical records the parties have or can
obtain as far in advance of examination as possible. After copies of the
report are distributed, the pretrial conference is resumed. In the event
of litigation, the trial judge or either of the parties may call the impartial
expert as a witness. Fees for the impartial expert for examining and
testifying have been set by him, subject to supervision of the judge,
and paid from project funds.
Compensation plans have utilized the services of staff physicians
and of special panels of private practitioners. However, the degree of
reliance upon specialists as impartial experts has not been very great."0 A
more thoroughgoing degree of such reliance may be built into the organi-
28. "We would have been more favorably impressed with the testimony of the
doctor had he not laid so much stress on the great number of 'cases' which he had
'won' in various courts as compared with the few which he had 'lost.' We have always
entertained the view that doctors neither 'win' nor 'lose' cases in which they testify as
experts." Smith v. W. Horace Williams Co., 84 So.2d 223 (La. Ct. of App. 1956).
The court however held that his failure to gain membership in the American Board of
Orthopedic Surgery did not disqualify him as an expert in orthopedics, although it could
be considered in weighing his opinion.
29. Peck, A Successful New Plan: Impartial Medical Testinony, 42 A.B.A.J. 931
(1956) ; Botein, The New York Medical Expert Testimony Project, 33 U. DEr. L. 3.
388 (1956).
30. Yerion, Expert Medical Testimony in Compensation Proceedings, 2 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 476 (1935).
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zation and structure of the decision-making itself, by the establishment
of medical boards with power to find facts binding upon the commission
generally charged with administration."'
Two kinds of hazard are involved in this plan. One is the range of
considerations indicated above 2 having to do with the proper employ-
ment of personnel with medical qualifications and the problem of dis-
entangling medical from legal opinions. These hazards may be mini-
mized by the careful referral of issues to the medical board in such form
that legal questions are excluded and the medical board is free to con-
centrate its attention upon medical questions, and by framing the find-
ings in such form as to disclose any errors in legal reasoning that may
inhere in medical findings or procedure before the medical board. Never-
theless these hazards are inherent in such a plan, especially in view of the
duty of the medical board to hear lay testimony (which as testimony is
not strictly a matter of medical competence to hear, but rather of trial-
examiner, referee, or trial-judge competence) and the limited range of
medical specialties that can feasibly be represented on a permanent medi-
cal board operating as an integral part of a public agency.
The other kind of hazard resembles one of the vices of partisan ex-
pert testimony. That is the tendency of a group of experts in industrial
medicine always functioning in the same role of conducting medical liti-
gation to acquire a set of official views representing the institution. Al-
though one of the goals for improving the derision of issues of medical
fact is the development of greater consistency, this consistency is not so
desirable as to justify a fixed attitude in the interpretation of evidence,
whether the effects are liberal or conservative of compensation.
Both kinds of hazards are minimized greatly if the medical boards
are constituted on an ad hoc basis, with due regard for matching the
qualifications of the expert body summoned for consultation with the
issues in the case referred. Moreover, the range of expertise from which
the members of such'boards are drawn may be greatly increased. The
general agency administering the plan will need a medical staff to assist
in evaluating the need for a special medical board and the qualifications
that should be mustered for it. A feature of the New York court plan
is worthy of incorporation into this process: staff advice should be sup-
plemented by the development of panels by medical bodies outside the
compensation agency, such as medical societies and schools.
31. For example, in Maryland the commission cannot reverse the findings of the
medical board on medical questions if the findings are supported by "legally sufficient"
evidence. Big Savage Refractories Corp. v. Geary, 209 Md. 362, 121 A.2d 212 (1956).
32. See text cited to Jenkins case, supra notes 3-8.
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Earlier discussion in this paper has relied upon a distinction between
perceptual knowledge and inferential knowledge. This distinction, for
purposes of medical board functions, may be elaborated to indicate how
much these boards can rely upon their own knowledge and to what extent
the knowledge must come in through an adversary hearing process. In-
ferences drawn from observation, especially from expert observation,
depend upon general knowledge. For example, judgment of the speed
of an automobile, if based upon precise measurement, depends upon such
general mathematical knowledge as is incorporated in the testing mechan-
ism and also that which is employed by the observer in reading the re-
sults. If it is based upon raw observation, the general knowledge applied
by the observer comes from a complex of memories of past experience.
Much depends upon the skill, as well as the knowledge, of the observer
in collecting the perceptual information. To this information, general
or abstract knowledge is applied to produce a judgment. If the measure-
ment mechanism is simple enough that little skill is required to apply it,
the mechanism may record data from which a non-observer can draw a
conclusion. In drawing the conclusion the general mathematical knowl-
edge that is built into the mechanism and that is employed by the non-
observer can be reliably applied to reach a conclusion. Another analogy
is the hypothetical question itself, by which perceptual knowledge is ver-
balized and summarized for a non-observing expert. The expert then
purports to have only generalized knowledge from which to make an
application to the knowledge supplied him. His contribution consists in
adducing the generalized knowledge and applying it to draw a conclusion
by inference."
Expert medical observation cannot be supplied by the medical board
in its capacity as trier of medical issues."4 For such information it must
hear witnesses, lay and medical, and in general depart from its medical
specialties into the legal business of according a fair hearing. Indeed, it
is sometimes doubtful whether it can apply its own generalized knowl-
edge without having expert testimony confirming it. At least its knowl-
edge should be made apparent in the record, by appropriate findings, and
preferably also by notice to the parties so that there is opportunity for
issue and rebuttal at the administrative level. 5
33. Cf. Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Pro-
cess, 55 HARV. L. REv. 364 (1942) ; Jaffe, Administrative Procedure Re-Examined: The
Benjamin Report, 56 HARV. L. REV. 704 (1943) ; 2 LARSON'S WORKMEN'S C01PENSATION
LAw 299-308 (1952).
34. Carstens v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 572, 158 Pac. 218 (1916).
35. Merton Lumber Co. v. Ind. Comm'n, 260 Wis. 109, 50 N.W.2d 42 (1951). Cf.
60 STAT. 241-42 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006(d) (1952) ; Davis, Official Notice, 62 HARV.
L. REV. 537 (1949).
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The difficulty of verbalizing some kinds of perceptual medical
knowledge (e.g., distorted facial expression, sweaty and flushed), the
existence of non-medical duties in the conduct of a trial, and the cumber-
someness of getting generalized knowledge in the record and recognized
on judicial review as such and as a legitimate subject of official notice
by a medical board-all these considerations argue against the use of a
medical board. In its favor is its solution of the problem of choice be-
tween conflicting expert opinions. In its absence the courts of necessity
swallow the spectacle of essentially uninformed choice by laymen be-
tween experts who are supposed to be informed but who disagree.38
An alternative solution lies along the lines of the New York plan.
Its tactic is to meet the problem of choice among conflicting expert
opinions by providing a basis for choice of the impartial opinion as
against an opinion suspected of partiality, or choice of the more authori-
tative opinion, whether from an expert chosen impartially or by a party,
as against the opinion of an expert whose expertise is suspected of short-
comings on the kind of issue involved. At the same time it affords full
opportunity for issue and rebuttal and full freedom of choice. It goes
further than partisan selection, giving the tribunal on its own motion an
opportunity to seek a remedy for apparent gaps in expert opinion, and
provides an impartial source of knowledge about the need for and the
prospects of finding assistance from expert knowledge. It attempts to
solve the problem posed by the limited diffusion of the best current
knowledge in a narrow field.
The context of medical issues arising in a scheme of non-court ad-
ministration of workmen's compensation affords opportunities for adap-
tation of the feature of pre-trial conference in the New York plan. Ad-
ministrative processes can be so shaped as to obtain the impartial opinion
at an early stage of controversy, well before hearing, so as to reduce the
number of cases that have to be subjected to formal litigation. At the
same time accommodations can be made that will reduce waste of the
time of the expert, by appropriate scheduling. In some jurisdictions the
opinion may be obtained in writing, and the analogue of the hypothetical
question can be proposed in written form adapted to the needs of the case
and influenced by conference among the parties and the tribunal, so as
to avoid the awkwardness of propounding a verbose question orally.
Thus, the expert opinion can be expounded in a more deliberate and en-
lightening fashion. These suggestions seem to be applicable in large part
36. "The court, in going beyond the medical evidence in reaching an equitable
decision, is not doing so on the supposition that it wishes to substitute its opinion for those
who are specialists in that field, but it must do so when the evidence is confusing and
lacking." Hebert v. Fifteen Oil Co., 46 So.2d 328 (La. Ct. of App. 1950).
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also to experts retained by the parties.
Answers to the analogue of the hypothetical question should be more
than naked conclusions." They should elucidate the medical reasoning,
and thus supplement the criteria for choice of opinion by relative im-
partiality and by relative record and reputation for expertise. They
would then become the foundation for tribunal findings in the event of
litigation, and these findings should then go a long way in giving the
court on judicial review an intelligible basis for discerning the founda-
tion in medical fact on which the order of the agency is based.
Conclusion
The division of functions proposed here asks the treating doctor to
expand his investigation beyond the bounds of seeking knowledge for the
purpose of healing, even into areas that are strictly speaking non-medical.
The argument for this emphasis is the necessity of obtaining perishable
information while it is still alive, and the strategic position of the treat-
ing doctor. The proposals further suggest ways in which different kinds
of medical expertness can be mobilized for their appropriate uses, so that
the possessor of abstract knowledge in a narrow specialty can relieve
other medical experts from the imposition of answering questions which
others are better qualified to answer. Attention has also been given to
some of the areas, such as the conduct of an adversary hearing, where
the specialized skills and knowledge are legal rather than medical. A
proper division of labor provides hope for the improvement of a complex
of activities that purports to be rational and to employ the skills and
knowledge of professional learning.
37. Osborn, Reasons and Reasoning in Expert Testimony, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
488 (1935).
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